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Angels Must Pay Taxes or the Status of
Theaters and Shows Under the
Internal Revenue Code
*FRANK MOSS
The recent case of Junior Miss v. Commissioner' raised some
questions as to the tax consequences of producing a Broadway
show. The immediate question before the tax court in that case
was whether the form of enterprise producing the show Junior
Miss resembled a corporation in enough respects to be taxed as
an "association" under Section 3797 of the Internal Revenue
Code 7' However, the magic words "show business" put one's
imagination into play and evoke numerous queries as to the tax
treatment of other aspects of the production as well. For in-
stance, how is the enterprise to be treated if it operates as a
limited partnership? Can the producer who is also a general
partner take a partnership deduction for the rent of his own
theater? What about the actor or actress who invests in the
enterprise as a limited partner but who also draws a salary?
What is the tax treatment of the author who sells or leases his
copyright to the business? What are the tax consequences re-
sulting from a sale of an angel's interest?
The business enterprise which produces a Broadway show
rarely, if ever, assumes the corporate form. In the main, this is
because the producer does not wish to incur the double tax
visited upon the dividend income of the corporate shareholder.!
In the case of large corporate earnings (which would be the sit-
uation where a show is a "hit") the double taxation of dividend
*A. B., Columbia University, 1949; LL.B., Ibid, 1951; Attorney for the
Port of New York Authority; Member New York Bar.
214 Tax Court 1 (1950). Acquiesced C. B. 1950-1, 3.
'Infra, page 30.
8 The corporation income tax applies to the entire net income of a cor-
poration, and no deduction from gross income is allowed for amounts
distributed as dividends to the shareholders. Any such dividends must
be included in the personal returns of the shareholders, who receive
no credit for the tax paid by the corporation. The result is that the
portion of a corporation's income which is distributed as dividends is
taxed twice.
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income becomes even more onerous.' One might add, if the cor-
poration desires to accumulate the earnings to avoid the double
tax there is still the possibility of the capital gains tax' upon sale
of stock or liquidation, not to mention the danger of the Section
102 penalty surtax upon income accumulated beyond the reason-
able needs of the business.'
On the other hand, a competing non-tax consideration is the
desirability of a convenient method of financing a high cost pro-
duction. Moderately wide sales of corporate stock with its ad-
vantages of limited liability and ready transferability can easily
serve this purpose. Limited liability is especially attractive to
the "angels," i.e. the financial backers of the show who will more
readily risk investment if all they stand to lose upon failure of
the enterprise is the original amount invested. However, the tax
considerations militating against the use of the corporate form
become overriding when there are in addition other modes of fi-
nance tQ take its place. Alternate forms of business enterprise,
such as the joint venture utilized by producer Max Gordon in
the Junior Miss case and the limited partnership which is in wide
use today, nonetheless pose major tax problems.
If the producer wishes to save himself and the angels the
double tax liability of incorporation but at the same time desires
to utilize some corporate advantages such as limited liability
without incorporating, will he nevertheless run the risk of hav-
ing his business taxed as a corporation under Section 3797 of the
I.R.C. and the Morrissey Doctrine?'
In the Junior Miss case the producer acquired non-assign-
able production rights in a play,' rented theaters, engaged actors,
'Under the 1950 Revenue Act corporations pay a 25% normal tax on all
their taxable income and an additional 22% surtax on all taxable in-
come over $25,000 for the taxable year beginning after June 30, 1950,
I.R.C. §§ 13, 15.
'I.R.C. § 117.
6I.R.C. § 102.
'Morrissey v. CIR, 296 U.S. 344, 56 S.Ct. 289, 80 L.Ed. 263 (1935).
'The producer enters into a contract with the author(s) called the "Mini-
mum Basic Agreement" (of the Dramatists Guild, Authors' League of
America and Theatrical Producing Managers) by which all production
rights are "personal" between the author and the manager, and "neither
the contract nor the rights granted thereby shall be assigned by the
manager without the consent of the Guild except to a corporation in
good standing with the Guild in which the assigning manager has con-
trol." Even then the manager is still personally liable on the contract,
. . . "It being the intention of the parties hereto that rights herein
conferred on the manager are personal to him and non-transferable
and non-assignable by operation of law ... ." In 1945 the "Minimum
Basic Agreement" was held invalid because in restraint of trade, Ring
v. Spina, 148 Fed. 2d. 647, but is still in use today.
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musicians, stage-hands, and bought costumes and scenery. To
meet production costs he solicited and received from various
acquaintances cash advances under separate contracts by which
he agreed to repay the advance (after provision for a sinking
fund of $10,000) and to give the contributor a specified percent-
age of profits, if any; in case of loss the contributor agreed to
forgive repayment of the advance and to bear an equal percent-
age of the loss. Management, control, and title to the property
in the enterprise remained vested in the producer. The producer
filed a partnership return under advice from his accountants.
The commissioner assessed a deficiency on the ground that the
enterprise was really an" association" under Section 3797 (a) (3)
of the Internal Revenue Code and hence was subject to corporate
tax rates. The appropriate section is as follows:
Section 3797. Definitions:
(a) When used in this title, where not otherwise
distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the
intent thereof-
(1) Person.-The term "person" shall be con-
strued to mean and include an individual, a trust, estate,
partnership, company, or corporation.
(2) -Partnership and Partner.-The term "partner-
ship" includes a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture,
or other unincorporated organization, through or by
means of which any business, financial operation, or
venture is carried on, and which is not, within the mean-
ing of this title, a trust or estate or a corporation; and
the term "partner" includes a member in such a syn-
dicate, group, pool, joint venture, or organization.
(3) Corporation. The term "corporation" includes
associations, joint-stock companies, and insurance com-
panies. (Italics supplied).
The tax court, in deciding for the taxpayer, held that the tests
of corporateness as laid down in the regulations' and the Moris-
sey case' were not met. The regulations define an "association"
subject to tax as a corporation as (1) any organization which
continues notwithstanding changes in its participants, and (2)
has a representative individual or board to conduct its affairs.
In approving these characteristics as proper tests of corporate
resemblance, the Supreme Court in Morrissey v. CIR' also stressed
as significant (3) title to the property embarked in the enterprise
'Regulation 111, §§ 29.3797-1, 29.3797.2.
-Supra, note. 7.
nIbid.
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held by a continuing body during the existence of the enterprise,
(4) facility for the transfer of a participating interest in the
enterprise, and (5) limitation of personal liability of the par-
ticipants to property embarked in the undertaking.' Here, the
tax court explained, even though the associates could transfer
their interests, there was no continuing representative manage-
ment nor was there limited liability. Title to the production
rights, on which continuity of the venture depended were vested
solely in the producer. The rights themselves were personal to
him, and if he died the enterprise died with him. Likewise, his
managerial position was not like that of a corporate officer or
board of directors acting in a representative capacity for stock-
holders. The associates could not "grant or deny him managerial
control since control was indefeasibly vested in him by contract
with the authors."' That control would have lapsed by trans-
fer of the production rights in violation of the contract or by
the death of the producer.
The feature providing a percentage of profit and loss was
not a limited liability device, the court stating at page 6:
"They acquired a right to a percent of the profits by
guaranteeing to reimburse Gordon for a like percent of
losses. This was no limited liability, as respondent sug-
gests. If the play had been unsuccessful, they would
have lost not only the advance, the only property risked
by them in the enterprise, but their guaranteed part of
the petitioner's losses, for which the contract fixed no
bounds at all."
The Commissioner acquiesced ' in the decision, but did not
do so until after the Broadway producers agreed to operate all
future productions as limited partnerships under New York law.'
Not long after the decision in the Junior Miss case was
handed down the League of New York Theaters, Inc., represent-
ing most of the producers of New York City, secured an agree-
ment 6 with the Bureau of Internal Revenue whereby the pro-
ducers agreed to operate future productions as limited partner-
"The tests are not rigid, and the various features of ownership and ad-
ministration must be considered as a whole for arriving at the classi-
fication of the entity. CIR v. Brouillard, 70 F. 2d. 154 (10th Cir. 1934);
Bert v. Helvering, 67 App. D.C. 340, 92 F. 2d. 491 (1937).
114 Tax Court 1, at page 8.
"Supra, note 1.
"'he source is Mr. J. F. Reilly, Executive Director of the League of New
York Theaters, Inc. The ruling is unpublished.161bi.
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ships under the New York Limited Partnership Law." The reg-
ulations state that a limited partnership is classified either as
an ordinary partnership or an association taxable as a corpora-
tion depending on its characteristics in certain material respects.
If the organization is not interrupted by the death of a general
partner or by a change in the ownership of his participating in-
terest, and if the management of its affairs is centralized in one
or more persons acting in a representative capacity, it is taxable
as a corporation.
The New York theater form of limited partnership enter-
prise consists of one or two general partners, the producers, who
have active control and management of the business and a sub-
stantial share in the enterprise, and several limited partners who
are contributing "angels." The limited partners have a per-
centage interest in the profits which is generally commensurate
with their investment, but their liability is limited to the amount
pledged as capital. They are subject to an "overcall", that is,
they are required to contribute more capital if the producer can-
not meet the production requirements. But this is limited to their
percentage interest, and there are no further obligations for ad-
ditional contributions after production requirements are met.
Limited partners' contributions are returnable only after the
play opens in New York City and after payment or provision
for all liabilities plus a cash reserve of X thousand dollars (any-
where from $10,000 to $25,000 is the usual amount depending on
the size of the production). Substitution of limited partners is
prohibited, and the partnership terminates on the death, insanity,
or retirement of the general partners. This kind of enterprise
clearly does not have the material corporate characteristics
which would require it to be defined as an association subject to
taxation as a corporation."m Although the management is cen-
tralized in the general partners they do not act merely in a
representative capacity because they own a fairly substantial
share of the partnership. Furthermore, they can neither be re-
moved nor controlled by the limited partners because control is
lodged in the general partners.' As to continuity of existence,
the organization is interrupted by the death of the general
partner or by a change in the ownership of his participating in-
"'New York Partnership Law, Article 8. Montana has adopted the pro-
visions of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act upon which the New
York law is modeled. See § 63-701, et seq., R.C.M. 1947.
'"Regulations, § 29.3797-5.
t Glensder Textile Co. v. CIR, 46 B.T.A. 176 (1942) ; Regulations,
§ 29:3797-5.2mGlensder Textile, supra, note 19.
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terest because the partnership terminates on the death, insanity,
or retirement of the general partners. The limited liability of
the limited partners is not controlling because the persons who
have active charge of the business are the general partners whose
liability is unlimited.' As to transferability of interests, the
limited partners are expressly prohibited by the partnership
agreement from transferring their interests, and the general part-
ner can not transfer his without ending the enterprise. Finally,
the partnership does not hold property as an entity because
under New York law the equitable right to the partnership prop-
erty is in the several partners as tenants in partnership."
It is important that the theater production stick to the fore-
going limited partnership form in order that it may not be classi-
fied as a corporation." Slight variations in form or operation
may produce a substantial change in tax treatment. For exam-
ple, if the general partners are without any substantial invest-
ment in the business and are acting as mere dummies and agents
of the limited partners, then the commissioner would be justified
in asserting a corporate tax. In Glensder Textile Co. v. CIR," a
decision holding a New York limited partnership non-taxable as a
corporation, the Board of Tax Appeals posed the foregoing con-
tention and implied that it would lead to a different tax result.
The limited partners are in that case closely analogous to cor-
porate shareholders, there being centralized representative man-
agement and limited liability of the interest holders.
Variations in state law likewise produce substantially dif-
ferent effects. Limited partnerships or partnership associations
of the type authorized by the statutes of Pennsylvania, Michigan,
and a few other states have consistently been held to be taxable
as corporations by the regulations? and the courts.' Limited
partnerships organized under the Uniform Limited Partnership
Act, upon which the New York statute is modeled, however, have
been held non-taxable as corporations by the courts,' even though
the regulations make no distinction in regard to the latter.' The
2New York Partnership Law, § 98. For corresponding provision in Mon-
tana law see § 63-803, R.C.M. 1947.
ONew York Partnership Law, § 51. For corresponding provision in Mon-
tana law see § 63-402, R.C.M. 1947.
'OSupra, note 19.
"Ibid.
2Regulations, § 29.3797-6.
2'CIR v. Jacob Frost, 13 T.C. 307 (1949) ; Glensder Textile Co. v. CIR,
Supra, note 19.TWestern Const. Co. v. CIR, 14 T.C. 453 (1950) ; aff'd 191 F. 2d (9th
Cir. 1951) ; Glensder Textile Co., 8upra, note 19. Taywal Ltd. B.T.A.
Memo. OP. Dkt. 107, 115 July 20, 1942.
"Regulations, § 29.3797-5, last sentence.
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difference is that the former, while nominally partnerships, pro-
vide for the limitation of liability of all the partners, whereas
under the Uniform Limited Partnership Act only the limited
partners have limited liability.
Montana has adopted substantially the provisions of the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act,' and presumably a produc-
tion organized under its provisions will not be held to be an asso-
ciation taxable as a corporation. In the recent case of Western
Construction Co. v. CIR.' a limited partnership created under
the limited partnership law of the State of Washington, which is
modeled upon the Uniform Act, was held not to be an association
taxable as a corporation on the authority of the Glensder case.
It is thus safe to say that a production organized as a limited
partnership under any state law which has adopted substantially
the provisions of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act will not
be held taxable as a corporation, provided, of course, that the
enterprise does not resemble the dummy limited partnership
hypothetically posed in the Glensder case.
However, the producers' worries do not end here. The use
of the partnership form introduces other tax problems which
are peculiar to that mode of conducting a business. These will
be dealt with in the material following.
The Internal Revenue Code" does not provide a definite
statutory concept of the nature of a partnership, sometimes treat-
ing it as an entity and sometimes treating it as a conduit through
which the individual partners receive gain or loss. Thus, a
partnership does not pay income tax as such, although it must
file a partnership return.' It is an accounting entity for the
purpose of computing the partnership net income' which is then
taxed to the partners as individuals. Each partner is made lia-
ble on his distributive share of such partnership income whether
or not an actual distribution has been made.' He must include
such share along with the rest of his taxable income in his in-
dividual return.' Likewise, each partner is entitled to his dis-
tributive share of any partnership losses.'
-R.C.M. 1947, § 63-701 et. seq.
"Supra, footnote 27.
"I.R.C. §§ 182-190.
-I.R.C. § 187.
'I.R.C. § 183.
'4I.R.C. § 182.
8Ibit.
'Regulations, § 29.182-1.
"I.R.C. § 182.
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The computation of partnership net income follows the same
rules as are applicable to the computation of the net income of
any individual engaged in business, with a few specific statutory
modifications.' Thus, the standard deduction, charitable con-
tributions deduction, and net operating loss deduction are not
allowed to the partnership, and adjustment therefor is made in
the patrners' returns.m
The following problems of partnership deductions, sale of a
partner's interest, and the partner's basis lack comprehensive
statutory coverage and are dealt with mostly on a decisional or
administrative level. The problems are treated by the adminis-
trator and the courts as they arise, but there is no definite single
principle emerging. Neither, it will be remembered, is there a
definite statutory concept to be used as a guidepost. A descrip-
tion of the tax treatment and a partial analysis, however, can be
attempted.
The producer who owns his own theater may list the rent
paid to himself as a deductible expense of the partnership so
long as it is a fixed charge and not a disguised distribution of
profits. In the recent case of Shirley v. O'Malley'° the district
court so held on the basis of the above rationale as to rent on
assets leased from the partners. It follows that if an author
leased the production rights in his play to the partnership for a
fixed charge and then also became a limited partner it would
seem that his payments as "rent" could still be taken as a de-
ductible expense. However, if payments are made in the form
of royalties dependent on the profits of the enterprise it is im-
plied that the commissioner would be upheld in asserting that
they are a distribution of partnership earnings and not an ex-
pense, the court stating on page 100:
"It is true that the Butcher case is not squarely in
point but the reasoning indicates that if the partnership
is under a binding liability to one of the partners for
the expense, that it should be allowed as a partnership
deduction.... The collector in distinguishing the Butch-
er case from the case presently before us relies on the
fact that there the rental payments were in no way tied
up or contingent upon partnership profits. We can only
point out that the rental payments were in no way tied
up or contingent upon the partnership profits in this
case.' "'
-I.R.C. § 183.
"I.R.C. §§ 183, 189.
"°91 F. Supp. 98 (1950 D. Neb.)
491 F. Supp. 98, at page 100.
8
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Interest paid on the capital contributions of the partners is
regarded as a distribution of profits or capital and not as an ex-
pense of the partnership." A similar result obtains on payment
for personal services of the partner. General Counsel's Memoran-
dum 6582" states:
"The withdrawals of members of a partnership are
not allowable deductions as salaries of such members in
computing net income of the partnership for income tax
purposes.... Partners are working for themselves and
in contemplation of law a man may not constitute him-
self his own employee .... Therefore, whatever is re-
ceived by a partner in the form of or under the name of
salary constitutes nothing more or less than a with-
drawal from the partnership of anticipated profits."
Thus, a producer may not deduct his salary for services as man-
ager as an expense of the partnership. A more interesting prob-
lem is that of the "hit" performer who also owns a limited part-
nership interest. It is likely that the commissioner will not allow
his or her salary to be taken as a deductible expense of the enter-
prise but will treat it as a distribution of earnings because in the
eyes of the tax law "partners are working for themselves, and
a man may not constitute himself his own employee."
Whether a particular item is a deductible expense of the
partnership or is to be treated as a distribution of earnings to
the individual partner usually should produce no difference in
the immediate tax consequences. It is to be remembered that the
partnership is an accounting entity and not a tax paying entity,
and that the payments made to the partners are nevertheless
taxable to them as their personal income even though the label
may read "partnership expense." However, there may be in-
stances where the difference is important. Consider, for exam-
ple, a salary received in December, 1950, in the partner's calen-
dar year 1950 but paid by a partnership whose fiscal year ends-
July 1, 1951. Because the salary is treated as a distribution of
profits it has taxable consequences for the partner in 1951 and
not 1950. This is so because a partner is taxable on his distribu-
tive share of the partnership income for its taxable year ending
within the partner's taxable year." If the salary were treated as
a partnership expense and not as a distribution of profits, pre-
-I.T. 2503, VIII-2 C.B. 145 (1929) ; CIR v. Banfield, 122 F. 2d. 1017 (9th
Cir. 1941) ; Regulations, § 29.183-1, last sentence.
-VIII-2 C.B. 200 (1929).
"I.R.C. § 188.
9
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sumably he would have to include it in his 1950 income, and the
partnership would take the deduction in 1951."
The sale of a partner's interest stimulates certain problems.
A recent news item mentioned that the investors (limited
partners) in "Guys and Dolls" were offered a 400% profit by
a syndicate if they would sell their interests in that " hit" produc-
tion." Assuming buyer and seller can get together on the price
and assuming no objection is raised by the other members of
the partnership agreement (substitution of limited partners is
generally prohibited), what is the tax treatment of the selling
partner?
Formerly, it was the position of the commissioner that the
sale of a partnership interest was a sale of the selling partner's
undivided interest in each specific partnership asset. Today,
however, he has changed his position in the face of overwhelming
authority to the contrary and now treats the sale of a partner-
ship interest as the sale of a capital asset under Section 117 of
the Internal Revenue Code.'" Hence, considerable tax savings
can be effected by a limited partner who sells his interest in a
successful show. In effect he is selling his right to future profits
which will now be taxed at capital gain rates rather than ordi-
nary rates." However, the valuation of a future interest in the
profits of an enterprise of such indefinite and variable duration
as a Broadway show is a practical consideration that must be
reckoned with when buyer and seller get together.
The method of distributing the cash proceeds was described
above. After all liabilities are met and a fixed reserve for con-
tingent losses is set up, a return of the limited partner's contribu-
tion is then made before profits are distributed. The reserve, if
not exhausted, is distributed on dissolution. This method of dis-
tribution raises some problems as to the adjustments to be made
in the individual partner's basis.
The partner's basis is originally the amount that he con-
tributes to the enterprise." Thereafter, it is adjusted up or down
to reflect certain aspects of partnership activity. Thus, if the
partner did not draw off his distributive share of the partnership
profits for the year he is nevertheless taxable on such share and
'CfI. Shirley v. O'Malley, supra, note 40, where rent on assets received
by the partner In 1942 was income to the partner in 1942 and a deduc-
tion to the partnership in 1943.
"Leonard Lyon's Column, New York Post, Nov. 30, 1950.
"G.C.M. 26379, C.B. 1950-1, 58 (1950).
-I.R.C. § 117.
"I.R.C. § 113(a).
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the amount is added to the basis of his partnership interest.' In
this context the cash reserve set aside out of partnership profits
for the year would fall into the category of undistributed part-
nership earnings; each partner would be taxable on his distribu-
tive share, and his basis would accordingly be increased. Further-
more, cash distributions representing a return of the partner's
contributions produce no tax because they are a return of capital,
but the basis of the partner's interest is accordingly reduced. If
an operating loss occurs the partner may use his share of such
loss as a deduction against his other income, and he also decreases
the basis of his partnership interest by the amount of the loss.'
Upon dissolution, where the usual method is to distribute any re-
maining cash proportionately, it is evident that normally no gain
or loss should be recognized. The intermediate adjustments which
the partner has made in his basis will equalize the basis and the
amount distributed. However, this equality may not exist where
the partner is one who has bought his interest from a prior part-
ner. Here, gain may result when the cash distribution exceeds
the basis, and loss where on dissolution it is less than the basis.
The Revenue Act of 1950 excludes "a copyright, literary,
musical or artistic composition, or similar property" from the
definition as a capital asset under Section 117 (a) (1) of the In-
ternal Revenue Code. This is true whether the foregoing property
is in the creator's hands or is in the hands of one to whom he has
made a gift of the property." The Act thus eliminates any doubts
existing before its passage that the income received by an author
for his work is to be taxed as ordinary income. Prior to the Act
there was a distinction drawn between a professional writer or
other creator of artistic works and the amateur who produced
an occasional original creation. The professional was taxed at
ordinary rates (whether he received royalties or sold the product
outright) because the products of his work were held "primarily
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or busi-
ness. "' The amateur received capital gain treatment on the sale
of his creative works.' The 1950 Act eliminates this distinction
but is applicable to taxable years beginning after September 23,
1950, the date of enactment.
The Section 107(b)' spread-provision still remains in the
5M egulations, § 29.113 (a) 13-2.51Appeal of Meyer, 3 B.T.A. 329 (1926).
'I.R.C. § 117(a) (1) (c) ii.
"Goldsmith v. GIR, 143 F. 2 d. 466 (2nd Cir. 1944).
"Dreymann v. CIR, 11 T.C. 153 (1948) ; cf. "Eisenhower Book Sale,"
N.Y. Herald-Tribune Oct. 3, 1948.
-I.R.C. § 107(b).
11
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law allowing the income from an artistic work to be "spread"
over the time (not exceeding 36 months) the work was done (a)
if the time spent from commencement to completion is at least
36 months and (b) if at least 80% of the total gross income from
the work is received only within the taxable year. The author
who sells his copyright outright and receives all the cash he is
ever going to get for it within the taxable year may clearly get
the benefit of the above provision if he complies with the 36
month work-requirement. However, the author of a "hit" who
leases production rights in the play to the producer in return for
royalties running as long as the show runs will not likely be able
to take advantage of the provision even if he complies with the
36 month work-period. A good "hit" may run well over a year,
not to mention the fact that the author may later receive further
gains by the sale of the radio, television, and movie rights. Thus,
it is seen that the Section 107 (b) provision is restricted in its
scope and is not likely to be of help to the playwright of a very
successful production.
Producers of "hit" shows which have heavy advance ticket
sales running into future tax years should be aware of the tax
consequences. It is generally held that payments received for
the performance of future services are income at the time of re-
ceipt and may not be deferred until the taxable year when per-
formance is to be made.' Likewise, if the taxpayer seeks to
nullify the receipt of the income by setting up a reserve for
anticipated liabilities and taking it as a deduction he will be de-
feated by the commissioner.' Thus, even though a manager may
be obligated to make a refund to the customers if the show cannot
go on at a future date, the money received for advance ticket
sales is nevertheless taxable income at the time of receipt.'
Such items as scenery and costumes, which are an ever-
present financial headache to the producer, may be the subject of
a depreciation allowance. The Regulations, Section 29.23(e)-2,
last sentence, state:
"Properties and costumes used exclusively in a business,
such as a theatrical business, may be the subject of a
depreciation allowance."
'Your Health Club, 4 T.C. 385 (1944) ; South Dade Farms, Inc. v. CIR,
138 F. 2d. 818 (5th Cir. 1943) ; South Tacoma Motor Co., 3 T.C. 411
(1949) ; National Airlines, Inc., 9 T.C. 159 (1947) ; Capital Warehouse
Co. Inc., 9 T.C. 966 (1947) ; affd 171 F. 2d. 395 (8th Cir. 1948). Contra:
Vienstra & De Haen Coal Co., 11 T.C. 964 (1948).
'
7Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193 (1934).
'National Airlines Inc.; Your Health Club, supra, note 56.
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In conclusion it may stated that the use of the New York
limited partnership as a business device to finance a Broadway
show solves the major problem of the producer and the "angel,"
both of whom wish to avoid the double taxation of corporate
shareholder income and yet retain limited liability for the latter.
Limited partnerships organized under the Uniform Limited Part-
nership Act, upon which the New York statute is modeled, do not
conform to the five salient features of corporate resemblance
which would make them "associations" taxable as corporations
under the Morrissey Doctrine, but variations according to differ-
ing state laws or manipulations in form and operations may lead
to a different tax result.
However, operation of a theater production as a limited
partnership opens up further tax problems which are peculiar to
the partnership form of doing business, and each problem must
be dealt with on an individual basis. Sometimes the conduit ap-
proach is adopted, and at other times the entity approach is used
leading to workable but differing results. Thus, (a) payments
in the form of salaries, royalties, or interest to the partners are
regarded as distributions of partnership earnings and not as
deductible expenses of the partnership (conduit), whereas pay-
ment as rent for the theater to a partner may be a partnership
expense (entity) ; (b) the sale of a limited partner's interest is
now treated by the Bureau as the sale of a capital asset (entity),
whereas it was formerly treated as the sale of an interest in each
individual asset (conduit) ; (c) the partner's basis, which is the
amount originally contributed to the enterprise, is intermediate-
ly adjusted to reflect undistributed partnership earnings or part-
nership losses and consequently no gain or loss is realized where
cash only is distributed to the partners on dissolution (conduit).
A new statutory approach may well be needed to dispel the seem-
ing confusion.
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